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THE NEED FOR PRE-PATENT
PROTECTION: AN ANALYSIS OF LEAR,
INC. V. ADKINS
In 1954 John Adkins applied for a patent on his plan for a
more accurate gyroscope which he had developed soon after being
hired by the Lear Corporation. Lear and Adkins entered into a
licensing agreement in 1955 in which Lear agreed to pay royalties
on Adkins' idea until the patent application had been refused or
the patent was held invalid. In 1957, after Adkins' patent
application had been rejected twice, Lear stopped paying royalties
on some of the gyroscopes; two years later it stopped payment
altogether. Adkins obtained his patent in 1960 and thereafter sued
for royalties accruing before and after the patent was granted. The
California Supreme Court' held that Lear was estopped to deny
the patent's validity due to "one of the oldest doctrines in the field
of patent law" which states that "so long as a licensee is
operating under a license agreement he is estopped to deny the
validity of his licensor's patent in a suit for royalties under the
agreement. ' 2 The holding was based on a similar ruling made by
the United States Supreme Court seventeen years earlier in
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research.3 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorarP to Lear in view of its
more recent decisions favoring a strong federal policy allowing
free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.5
In reversing the California Supreme Court holding, the Supreme
Court divided the payments into two groups, those accruing before
the patent was issued and those accruing thereafter. It held that
Lear must be allowed to attack the validity of the patent as a
defense to the payments accruing after the patent was issued.
However, as to the payments accruing prior to the issuance of the
patent, the Court postponed the question.6
The purpose of this note is twofold: first the history of the
1. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 453 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967). The
California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the verdict for Adkins, and affirmed
in part and reversed in part the judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Lear.
2. Id. at 891,435 P.2d at 325-26, 64 Cal. Rptr. 549-50.
3. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
4. 391 U.S. 912 (1968).
5. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
6. Lear, Inc., v. Adkins, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 1913 (1969).
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estoppel rule and the exceptions thereto will be traced; second the
need and justification for some degree of pre-patent protection for
the inventor will be discussed.
Licensee estoppel was first applied by the Court in Kinsman
v. Parkhurst' in 1855. Basically, the rule prohibits the licensee of
a patent to directly challenge the- validity of the patent in a suit
brought for royalties due under the contract Thirty-seven years
after Kinsman, the Court in Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormull5 created
the first and probably most noteworthy exception. The Court
refused as a matter of public policy to enforce a contract which
denied the licensee the right to contest the validity of the patent.
The Pope Court stated that the importance of not represssing
competition by giving protection to worthless patents was equal
to the necessity of offering protection to valuable inventions; use
of licensee estoppel to protect a worthless patent would result in
the repression of competition, and as such, would be against
public policy. The interest in eliminating protection for worthless
patents was also a strong factor in the Court's Lear decision)10
After the Kinsman decision, several other notable exceptions
to the estoppel doctrine arose. The doctrine of eviction 1 was
announced in Drackett Chemical Co. v. Chamberlain Co." This
exception allowed the licensee to defend an action for royalties by
showing that a third party had proved the patent invalid.
In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 13 the Court
allowed a licensee to deny the validity of patents which had
expired, on the ground that to do otherwise would be inconsistent
with the patent laws because patent policy dictates that once a
patent expires, the idea becomes part of the public domain and is
outside protection. It should be noted that the Lear Court stated
that the Scott decision had severely undermined the very basis of
the estoppel rule." The Scott reasoning applies only to post-patent
payments, not to pre-patent payments, since it concerns patents
which have expired-
7. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289, 293 (1855).
8. See4 F. WALKER, PATENTS § 403, at 607 (2d Deller ed. 1965).
9. 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
10. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S.Ct. at 1911.
1i. See 4 F. WALKER, PATENTS § 420, at 703 (2d Deller ed. 1965).
12. 63 F.2d 853, 854 (6th Cir. 1933); See also White v. Lee, 14 F. 789, 791 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1882).
13. 326 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1945).
14. 89 S.Ct. at 1909.
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The "anti-trust" exception was created soon after the Scott
decision in Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metalic Mfg. Co." and
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co." The Court held
that price-fixing clauses could not be severed from clauses
prohibiting the licensee from contesting the validity of the patent;
therefore, the total agreement was rendered invalid, and the
licensee was allowed to challenge the validity of the patent. In
1947, Justice Frankfurter concluded that Katzinger and
MacGregor had so weakened the estoppel rule that the Court
should have at least given the rule a decent public burial. 7
Ironically, three years after Justice Frankfurter wrote his plea, the
estoppel rule was declared to be the "general rule" in Automatic
Radio."s Prior to the Automatic Radio decision, the rule had not
been applied by the Court since United States v. Harvey Steel
Co.," decided in 1905. The above noted exceptions had made the
rule applicable in "an ever-narrowing set of circumstances. '20 The
doctrine, however, was expressly overruled in the Lear decision 2'
The Lear Court divided the suit for payments into two
groups. The first group was the post-patent payments. The Court
espoused two basic reasons for overruling the "general rule" and
allowing the licensee to challenge the validity of the patent. First,
it reasoned that since a patent is nothing more than a legal
conclusion of the patent office, made without aid of arguments of
those who would contest the validity of the patent, it is therefore
fair to require the licensor to defend the judgment of the patent
office. This is especially true "since the licensor's case is
buttressed by the presumption of validity which attaches to his
patent. ' 22
Second, the Court stated that the public interest in allowing
full and free competition in the use of ideas outweighed the
equities of the licensor. Allowing the estoppel rule to restrain the
licensee might continually force the public "to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification.Z 3 The Court
15. 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
16. 329 U.S.402 (1947).
17. Id. at 416 (dissenting opinion).
18. 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950).
19. 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
20. 89 S. Ct. at 1908.
21. Id. at 1911.
22. Id.
23. Id. See also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. at 235.
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ruled that Lear must be allowed to question the validity of the
patent.24
The second group of payments, which the Court believed
involved the more difficult question, were those which accrued
prior to the issuance of the patent while Lear was under contract
with Adkins. Because of the contractual relationship, Lear had
obtained special access to Adkins' ideas which gave it an
important benefit not generally made available to licensees. The
majority viewed the right of the licensor to enforce the obligation
as a question of the power of states to protect the owners of
inventions prior to the grant of a patent. Answering this.question
was postponed until a state court has determined the extent of
protection to be afforded the holders of unpatented ideas. "
Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, dissented as to the second group of royalty payments.
Black believed that postponing the question of the states' power
to enforce such an agreement (pre-patent royalties) was directly
in conflict with the Court's earlier decisions in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiff el Co.,2 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting7
which denied the states the power to give protection "of a kind"
which clashes with the objectives of federal patent law.
Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, states had
granted patents;2 8 however, the power to grant patents was
enumerated in the Constitution as a power of Congress.29 The
federal courts were given exclusive jurisdiction in cases arising
under the patent laws ° Thus a state cannot, consistently with the
supremacy clause of the Constitution,1 grant a patent or extend
the life of an existing patent 2 For the states to do so would be a
24. As to royalty payments which accrue while contesting the patent, the Court ruled
that to require Lear to pay would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.
89 S.Ct. at 1912. The Court also ruled that if Lear could prove the patent to be invalid,
he would be permitted to avoid all royalties accruing after the patent was issued. Id. at
1913.
25. Id. at 1913.
26. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
27. Sears, Robuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964); see also 376 U.S.
234 (1964).
28. 1 F. WALKER, PATENTS § 7, at51 (2d Dellered. 1965).
29. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (B.
Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964).
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
32. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
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direct exercise of control over patents, which is expressly
forbidden. On the other hand, for the purpose of determining
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, it has been established
that actions to set aside, specifically enforce, or to recover
royalties on a patent license are not actions arising under the
patent laws of the United States. In such actions, the states can
exercise valid jurisdiction 3  The states can therefore exercise an
indirect means of control in the patent field, or at least they have
the jurisdictional basis to do so.
The question is to what extent, if at all, states can indirectly
control articles which are not within the protection of the federal
patent laws.: In Sears, the Court held that an inventor's ideas
which do not merit patent protection can be copied and sold by
anyone. Such unpatentable articles, as well as those on which the
patent has expired, are part of the public domain and are beyond
protection from any source, state or federal 4 Arguably, an article
which is simply unpatented would also be subject to the same
classification, that is, beyond protection.35 The Sears Court stated:
"Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding
unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws. '3 The Court reasoned that
to allow the states to afford protection even to articles which merit
protection under the federal patent laws would be to give the states
the power to grant articles a perpetual patent.37 The Sears Court
seems to have completely prohibited any means of indirect state
protection of ideas, even: if the idea actually does merit protection.
The Sears and Compco cases involved ideas which were being
openly produced on the market, not ideas which were secret and
held only by the inventor, as was the case in Lear. The issue in
Lear was to what extent, if at all, an inventor is protected if he
33. Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850); See also Farmland Irr. Co. v.
Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957), Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th
Cir. 1964).
34. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231; see also Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
35. See Kestenbaum, The Sears and Compco Cases: A Federal Right to Compete by
Copying, 51 A.B.A.J. 935 (1965).
36. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
37. As is the case in Lear, if the states were to offer full protection to Adkins during
the five year period prior to the issuance of the patent, they would extend his protection
from seventeen years to twenty-two years. This is clearly inconsistent with the patent law.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1965).
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contracts to reveal his secret ideas prior to the time he secures a
patent for those ideas. To deny contractual protection for the
investor's ideas prior to his securing a patent would in effect make
the patent itself the only means of protection available to
inventors. It may be sound policy to deny protection for ideas
which are part of the public domain, such as those on which
patents have expired or those that are unpatentable; however, is
this logic sound when extended to secret ideas known only to the
inventor?
The Lear Court recognized that the process of gaining a
patent can extend over a period of years.38 During this period, if
the inventor can be afforded no protection, he may be forced to
keep the idea secret until the patent is granted. Under this
arrangement, ideas which possibly could make significant
contributions to science, industry, or society in general would be
withheld from public disclosure to the possible detriment of all
concerned. There must be a compromise between giving protection
to ideas which in the long run may be worthless, and depriving
the public of ideas which might significantly contribute to the
betterment of society.
Licensee estoppel was the product of judicial compromise
between contract and patent law.39 In overruling licensee estoppel,
the Court has left patent law as the only means of protection
available to the inventor. If the inventor has not yet secured a
patent, he is completely unprotected if he reveals his secret ideas
to a third party.
The importance of the patent laws cannot be overstated;
without them, significant ideas have been lost or maintained in
secrecy for hundreds of years, depriving society of the benefits that
could have been derived from those ideas ° However, the
importance of the patent laws cannot be allowed to overshadow
the need for recognition of the principle that contract law is
needed for the protection of pre-patent ideas while the inventor is
seeking a patent. The main objective of the patent laws is "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts."" Since
patent protection takes time to secure, there is a need to offer the
inventor some measure of protection prior to the granting of the
38. 89 S.Ct. at 1911.
39. Id.
40. Rines, Do We Need A Patent System?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 501 (1969).
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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patent so as to avoid the seclusion of ideas and the resultant
stalemate to science and the useful arts.
The distinction must be drawn between patent protection,
which protects the inventor from infringement by any other
party," and contractual protection which acts only between the
inventor and the party who has "purchased" the use of the
inventor's idea prior to his securing a patent. The purchasing
party believes the idea to be meritorious or he would never agree
to pay the inventor for the use of it. Once the purchaser enters
into the licensing agreement, the basic principles of contract law
prohibit him from repudiating his contract simply because he
discovers that he has made a poor bargain. It hardly seems unfair
to place a burden on the would-be licensee to check into the
novelty of such an idea; if he is not convinced of the novelty, he
need not enter into the agreement. Under the dissent's approach
in Lear, the licensee could avoid pre-patent royalties even on ideas
which later were patented and successfully defended in an action
brought by the licensee. In a case of this type, the licensee would
have the use of a patentable idea without payments until the
patent was secured-which could be for several years.
Strict licensee estoppel with no exceptions may be contrary
to the public policy; however, if no protection of any kind is
offered to inventors prior to the grant of a patent, the rate of
progress of the sciences and useful arts may be greatly hindered.
The problem raised by the rapid development of new ideas and
changing technology calls for more expedient ways to circulate
new ideas into the mainstream of science and the useful arts, not
decisions by the Court which will impede the flow of these ideas.
The courts must develop a means to protect new ideas prior to
the securing of patent protection. It is suggested that the contract
law is a logical means both to protect the inventor and to promote
the development of new ideas.
STEPHEN J. SUNDVOLD
42. 35 U.S.C: § 271 (1964).
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